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Had she been born half a century earlier, she might have written
her eighth-grade essay on Susan B. Anthony, or Florence Nightingale,
or perhaps Jane Addams. But, fortunately for the law, Norma Levy
was born in 1928, and so it was that she chose as the subject of her es-
say-and role model-Florence Ellinwood Allen, ajustice of the Ohio
Supreme Court who, in 1934, was named by President Franklin Roo-
sevelt to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. Judge Allen was the first woman to serve as a judge on a fed-
eral court established under Article III of the Constitution. Aspiring
to go Judge Allen one better, Norma Levy decided to be the first
woman appointed to the Supreme Court. But that goal was to elude
her-one of the few goals that has. Instead, pursuant to appointment
by President Jimmy Carter in 1978, Norma Levy-by then, Norma
Levy Shapiro-became the first woman to serve on the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and, thereby,
the first woman judge of any Article III court in the entire Third Cir-
cuit.' (When Norma Levy Shapiro became Judge Shapiro in 1978,
t United States DistrictJudge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
The following year President Carter appointed Dolores K. Sloviter to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Sylvia H. Rambo to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and Anne E. Thompson to the
United States District Court for NewJersey.
President Carter, with the strong support of his Attorneys General (Griffin B.
Bell followed by Benjamin R. Civiletti), was the first president to give serious and sus-
tained attention to the appointment of women (and, equally important, of African
Americans) to the federal bench. President Carter's appointment of four women to
judgeships in the Third Circuit was paralleled by Carter appointments of women
judges, both trial and appellate, in several of the otherjudicial circuits.
Because not all of President Carter's successors have kept pace with his initiative,
there is still a substantial gender imbalance (as well as racial imbalance) in every cir-
cuit. In the four jurisdictions comprising the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands), the gender distribution, as of September 2003
when this essay is being written, is as follows: (1) Of the ninety-three district judges,
active and senior, in the Third Circuit, only fifteen are women. (2) Things are better
at the appellate level: of the twentyjudges (twelve in active status, eight senior) of the
third Circuit Court of Appeals, four (all in active status) are women. Of the non-
Article Ill judges in the Third Circuit, there are thirteen women magistrate judges and
nine women bankruptcyjudges.
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there were only seven other women on the federal bench in the entire
country.)
And so, for twenty-five years, Judge Shapiro (hereinafter, "Sha-
piro 2 ) has been an ornament of Article III. But it is not her firstness3
that sets her apart. What stamps her as remarkable are the wisdom,
strength, and sensitivity that have characterized her judicial perform-
ance day after demanding day. These are the qualities that those of us
privileged to be her judicial colleagues here in Philadelphia have had
the good fortune to be particularly familiar with.4
To acquire a comprehensive sense of the excellence of Shapiro's
judging would call for parsing and close assessment of at least a repre-
sentative sample of the hundreds of cases she has had in charge in her
quarter-century on the bench. An intensive scholarly appraisal of that
sort is beyond the scope of this celebratory tribute. But there is one
case of Shapiro's which may properly be looked to as a proxy for the
entirety of her caseload-for it drew on her (seemingly inexhaustible)
energies for eighteen years, and it required her to perform tasks that,
2 How best to refer to the subject of this essay has seemed something of a puzzle.
Needless to say she is "Norma" to all her judicial colleagues, not alone here in the east-
ern district but throughout the third circuit and, indeed, throughout the length and
breadth of Article 111; and she is also "Norma" to endless other constituencies, lawyers
and non-lawyers alike, young and old, here in Philadelphia and across the land, of
whom the author of this essay is one. However, for thosee many readers of this issue of
the Law Review who do not have the good fortune of being personally acquainted with
Norma, she is 'Judge Shapiro." But to refer to her by title throughout this essay would
be cumbersome and off-putting. The compromise designation adopted here is "Sha-
piro," a form of address used by none of the Judge's constituencies and hence, for pre-
sent purposes, appropriately neutral
3 On graduating from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1951, Shapiro
was chosen by Pennsylvania's Chief Justice Horace Stern as his law clerk, the first
woman to be appointed to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court clerkship. Later, after sev-
eral years as a highly achieving litigator at the firm Dechert, LLP, Shapiro became the
first woman to serve on, and subsequently to chair, the Board of Governors of the
Philadelphia Bar Association. Had she, in 1978, elected not to become a judge but to
stay in practice, there was an odds-on likelihood that, within a year or two, she would
have become the first woman chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association. Whether
Shapiro would, in the fullness of time, have then gone on to become the first woman
president of the American Bar Association (ABA) is, of course, rather more specula-
tive. But donning a robe has not precluded important ABA activity: Shapiro has pur-
sued, with great effectiveness, those ABA roles that are appropriate forjudges. We who
are Shapiro's District Court colleagues are particularly proud that, as of this year, she
has ascended to membership in the ABA Board of Governors. For an accounting of
Shapiro's significant contributions to the work of the ABA, see the Tribute by one of
the nation's leading lawyers, former ABA PresidentJeromeJ. Shestack, in this issue of
the Law Review. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 21 (2003).
4 An added dimension of our collegial devotion to Shapiro is our gratitude for
her sisterly caring for each of us-on birthdays and all days in between.
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fortunately, fewjudges have occasion to undertake. The case was Har-
ris v. City of Philadelphia. Harris began in 1982 as a class action filed
pro se by inmates of Holmesburg Prison complaining that flagrant
overcrowding had created debilitating and degrading-effectively hy-
per-punitive-conditions transgressing the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Far from being eager to exercise jurisdiction, Shapiro
abstained: in Shapiro's view, the Court of Common Pleas, in which
similar litigation had been commenced some years before, was the
more appropriate forum to address problems besetting Philadelphia's
prison system. But the Court of Appeals in 1985 concluded that, not-
withstanding the ongoing state court litigation, the federal claims war-
ranted federal judicial scrutiny.6 The case was back on Shapiro's
docket.
In 1986, the plaintiff class and the City of Philadelphia entered
into a court-approved consent decree that provided, inter alia, for (1)
construction of a new detention center within four years, and (2) in
the event that Philadelphia's prison population rose above an agreed
maximum, (a) the discharge from custody of inmates whose sentences
were to end in sixty days and (b) the release pending trial of pre-trial
detainees charged with minor offenses. To oversee compliance with
the consent decree, a Special Master was appointed. But the new de-
tention center promised by the City for 1990 did not materialize, and
in 1991 a new consent decree contemplating substantially more effec-
tive and extensive municipal compliance was entered into. Some
sense of the range of Shapiro's manifold supervisory roles can be
gleaned from two paragraphs of her 2000 opinion closing the books
on Harris:
Relief, both short and long term, for the overcrowded facilities was
anticipated by the 1991 Decree. The short term relief included ex-
panded capacity and early release of eligible pretrial detainees. Thus,
the court has overseen the construction and completion of an additional
prison facility, Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF"), and a
new criminal courthouse, the CriminalJustice Center at 12th and Filbert
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12579 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2000).
6 Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 758 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.
1985) [Harris 1]. The Harris litigation has often revisited the Court of Appeals: Harris
v. Pensley, 820 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1987) [Harris 11]; Harris v. Reeves, 946 F.2d 214 (3d
Cir. 1991) [Harris III], reh'g denied en banc, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26055 (3d Cir. Oct.
31, 1991); Harris v. Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840 (3d Cir. 1994) [Harris V]; Harris v.
Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311 (3d Cir. 1995) [Harris V]; Harris v. Philadelphia, 47 F.3d
1333 (3d Cir. 1995) [Harris VI]; Harris v. Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1342 (3d Cir. 1995)
[Harris V/I]; and Harris v. Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998) [Harris VII].
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Streets in Center City, Philadelphia. The Holmesburg facility, from
which the action originated, has been closed. In addition, the Alterna-
tive and Special Detention Central Unit ("ASDCU"), a minimum security
facility was built. After extensive litigation over compliance with industry
standards, see Harris IV, n.1, the parties reached a settlement requiring
the City to provide job, vocational or educational programs to all in-
mates housed there. The court approved the settlement on March 31,
1995.
The City is currently building a new Women's Detention Facility to
increase female capacity. The City does not intend to close or renovate
the House of Correction as set forth in the City's Ten Year Plan.
In accordance with the 1991 Consent Decree and as set forth in its
Alternatives to Incarceration Plan, the City has contracted for commu-
nity-based substance abuse treatment and support services for paroled
inmates in a program called Forensic Intensive Recovery ("FIR"). Its
purpose is to enhance community safety by reducing criminal recidivism
in providing supervised treatment of substance abuse and mental illness
as an alternative to incarceration. There are currently fifty-three drug
and alcohol programs providing clinical evaluation, residential treat-
ment, or intensive outpatient treatment services to over 1200 partici-
pants as an alternative to incarceration. The recidivism rate of program
participants has been significantly lower than that of inmates not in the
program: it is a true success story.
But no good deed goes unpunished. It was expectable that fed-
eral judicial oversight of Philadelphia's prison system would, from
time to time, require the court to address difficult and warmly de-
bated issues, and that a litigant or interest group on the losing side of
such an issue might give public expression to dissatisfaction with an
adverse decision. Fair criticism of what courts do is normal and, in
general, to be welcomed. As Judge William Hastie put it thirty years
ago, in a Roberts Lecture here at the University of Pennsylvania,
"principled criticism serves as an invaluable corrective of otherwise
unrealized error.,
8
What was not expectable was that, in a circumstance in which fed-
eraljudicial oversight was the consequence of decrees the city had as-
sented to and, indeed, had a major hand in shaping, a ranking local
law enforcement official would spice up criticism of the judge's deci-
sions by impugning the judge's motives. Yet this was the course pur-
sued by a senior Philadelphia prosecutor who, in 1994, advised a wait-
ing world that the judge "sees it as her personal mission to bring
7 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12579, at *8-9.




about change in the penal system. But she's elevated the rights of the
prisoners above the rights of everyone else, and she's done it without
regard to the consequences. ' A comment of this sort by a public offi-
cial who, on behalf of the executive branches of both state and local
government, has major responsibilities for the administration of jus-
tice, carries with it the real risk of undermining public confidence in
the judicial process-and the risk is compounded when the official is
a lawyer, an officer not only of the state courts, but of the very federal
court whose commitment to justice the lawyer is calling into question.
And there is the related risk that a judge may be cowed by criticism of
this malign sort-criticism to which, by virtue of judicial office, a
judge cannot effectively reply-and may then conform future deci-
sions to the perceived norms of the loud-speaking executive official,
thus fatally compromising the independence of the judiciary.10 Fortu-
nately (and just as one would expect) Shapiro is made of sterner stuff:
she has never given in to the sideline yahoos, however lofty their rank
or shrill their voices, and never will. This is true outside the court-
room as well as within, as evidenced by the words of tribute paid to
Shapiro when the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
FederalJudicial Improvements conferred on her its Meador-Rosenberg
Award. In listing a number of Shapiro's "profound contributions to
the administration ofjustice," the Standing Committee took particular
note of the fact that Shapiro "has relentlessly pursued projects and ini-
tiatives that promote the importance of an independentjudiciary."
1 2
Of Shapiro's seemingly endless string of honors, the Meador-
Rosenberg Award, conferred on August 7, 2003, is not even the most
recent. On August 8, 2003, Shapiro was honored by the National As-
sociation of Women Judges with its Excellence in Service Award.
3
9 Zachary Stalberg, Editorial, PlILA. DAILY NEWS, June 20, 1994, at 31. Not to be
outdone, Editor Stalberg saw fit to confer on Shapiro the sobriquet "Public Enemy
Number One." Id. This sort of mindless journalistic excess tends to give the First
Amendment a bad name; but, as against the inappropriate calumnies of public offi-
cials, it is relatively harmless.
0 See Louis H. Pollak, CriticizingJudges, 79JUDICATURE 299 (1996).
Harris continued, under Shapiro's wise and even-handed adjudication, until the
end of the decade. On August 30, 2000, Harris was concluded pursuant to court ap-
proval of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on June 28, 2000. The
termination of the litigation via the court-approved Settlement Agreement was in har-
mony with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000) [PLRA]. For an
authoritative discussion of the PLRA, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
12 Remarks of Tom Hayward, ABA Annual Meeting, (Aug. 7, 2003) (on file with
author).
13 This essay is written in September of 2003. Next month Shapiro's portrait will
20031
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Over the years, many hundreds of words have been devoted to extol-
ling this exemplary public servant. But no extoller has said it better
than her friend and senior partner at Dechert, LLP, Robert M. Landis,
speaking to the court on September 29, 1978, the day Norma Levy
Shapiro ascended the bench: "[W]e see before us a person of breadth
of understanding; of sensitivity and compassion; pragmatic in the way
one should be in public affairs; rigorously disciplined in scholarship
and with an innate sense of judgment and human wisdom. Surely
Norma Shapiro will be a many-splendored Judge."1
4
be presented to our court. By the time this issue of the Law Review appears, later this
fall, it is altogether likely that fresh bushels of honors will have descended on our so-
very-deserving colleague.
14 Administration of the Oath of Office asJudge of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to Norma Levy Shapiro, Esq. (Sept. 29, 1972),
at 22 (on file with author).
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